University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

6-19-1962

Paulson v. Superior Court of El Dorado County
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
58 Cal.2d 1

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

·l>ETERMINED·IN '

THE

SUPRE~IECOURT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

[Sac. No. 7398.

JnBank~June19, 1962.]

•

RICHARD J. PAULSON,Petitio~er,v.THESUPERIOR
COURT OF EL DORADO COUNTY, Respondent ; THE
PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. .
.[1] Prohibition-Application', of, Rules~Oriminal Proceedings.Prohibition is a proper remcdy to prevent retrial when' a defendant has been once in jeopardy.
[2] Oriminal Law-Former Jeopardy-When Jeopardy Attaches;~
Jeopardy attaches to a <lcfendant when be is placed on trial
before a court of competent jurisdiction on a valid indictment·
or information before a jury duly impaneled and charged with
his deliverance.
[3] Id.-Former Jeopardy-When Jeopardy Attaches.-If a jury
is discharged without a verdiet, defendant cannot again be
put in. jeopardy unless be consented ,to the discharge or legal
necessity required it.
['] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Discharge of Jury.-The discharge of
a jury contrary to law is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal.
[1] See .Cal.Jur.2d, Prohibition, § 64 et seq.; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22.
.
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 183 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,.§'369 et seq.
[4] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 188 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 406 et seq.
,
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 41; [2, S] Criminal
Law, § 120; [4, 13] Criminal Law, § 132; [6] Criminal Law,
§§ 354,1303; [6,7, 9-12] Criminal Law, § 354; [8] Criminal Law, ,
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(5] Id.-Jury-Discharge Aftel' Retirement: Appeal-Discretion
of Trial Court.-AIthough the determination whether there it'
a reasonable probability that the jury can agree rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court, the power of the court to
discharge a jury without the prisoner's consent is not an absolute, uncontrolled discretionary power. The power must be
exercised in accordance with established legal rules and a
sound leg'nl discretion in the application of such rules to the
facts and circumstances of each particular case, and the exercise of the power is subject to review by an appellate court.
(6] Id.-Jury-Di5charge After Retirement.-An extrajudicial report from the jury that it e:mnot agree on a "erdict does not
justify its discharge.
(7] Id.-Jury-Diseharge After Retirement.-There was no justification for discharging a jury on the basis of the bailiff's report
that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked where the jury was
discharged after deliberatin~ less than five hours, and where,
though the jury returned to the courtroom to have four questions answered, they were given no opportunity to consider
the judge's answers during further deliberations, no juror ever
stated in open court that he thought the jury could not reach
an agreement, and defendant's counsel was not present when .
the bailiff made the report and did not learn of this extrajudicial communication until the judge alluded to it in refusing to entertain defendant's plea of once in jeopardy 17
days after the jury was discharged.
(8] Id.-Jury-Communications Between Court and Jury.-All
communications between court and jury should be made in
open court. Ordinary procedure would require that the trial
judge afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of any
such communication and to have the opportunity to make
timely objection to any action by the court or jury which
might be deemed irregular.
[9] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-Ordinarily the trial
judge should not discharge a jury on the ground that there i'3
no reasonable probability that the jury can agree witbout
questioning the jurors individually as to such probability.
(10] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-The statute does
not provide what procedure shall be taken to determine the
probability of an agreement between the jurors, but the court
may obtain from them an expression of their judgment and,
in the exercise of the discretion committed to it, give such
weigbt to this opinion as the surrounding circumstances seem
to demand.
[11] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-AItbough the judge
,
need not state that he is discharging the jury because there
is no reasonable probability that they can agree when it is .
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apparent from the record that he discharged the jury for that
reason, such probability is not npparent from a record showing
that, after the jury entered the courtroom, the foreman stated
that no verdict had been rene\tt'd, hut he ;;ave no indication
that he or any other juror considered further deliberations
futile. Hi:!! 113king the judge to inl'truct on two points of law
and to clarify two evidentiary matters strongly suggests that
the jurors felt they could reach a verdict if these legal and
factual questions could be re!'olvetl.
[12] Id.-Jury-Discharge After Retirement.-It was not necessary to diRcharge the jury ufter it had deliberated for less than
five hours on the ground that the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated where the trial judge knew that the jury
stood ten for acquittal and two {or conviction on onc of two
counts for grand theft.
[IS] ld.-Former Jeopardy-Discharge of Jury.-Once the jury is
impaneled and sworn, defendant is in jeopardy. He cannot
be deprived of any benefit to be derived from that jeopardy
and is entitled to have the jury render a verdict when he haR
not consented to the discharge of the jury and there is no legal
necessity for sueh discharge.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of El Dorado County from retrying petitioner on
criminal charges following a mistrial. Writ granted.
Lynn Carman for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Nat A. Agliano, Deputy Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-III this proceeding in prohibition petitioner
seeks to preclude his trial on two counts of grand theft on
the ground that the trial would h-Yice put him in jeopardy
in violation of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.
On December 18 and 19, 1961, petitioner was tried by a
jury on two counts of grand theft. The jury retired at 4 :12
p.m. on December 19 and returned to the courtroom at 9 :05
p.m. When th~ court asked if the j\ll'y had arrived at a verdict, the foreman replie(l, "Yonr IlOilOI', wc have not reached
a verdict. We have some questions that we would like to ask
and advice from the Court if we may t" The first question,
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relating to Count 1, was whether a charge of theft is nullified
if the victim agreed to accept weekly paYD1ents as restitution.
The court reread an instruction that restitution is not a defense. The second question, relating to Count 2, was "would
negligence in the care of the funds, whereby another persoll
D1ay have stolen the money still leave the Defendant responsible anu guilty of theft Y" The court answered: " Well, Mr.
Foreman, we are here only concerned with the charge against
the Defendant. No one else is charged with theft. The Defendant is not charged with negligence, be is cbarged witb
tbeft. If from the evidence you find that the Defendant is
110t guilty, find him not guilty. If under tbe evidence you
find that he is guilty, find him guilty in accordance with the
evidence and the instructions. Now, that is all the Court can
say." The third and fourth questions involved two evidentiary matters that were clarified by the court and counsel.
The following exchange then ensued:
"THE COURT: What is your next question'
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: That is all I have here, Your Honor,
unless some question has arisen in the minds of any of the
jurors at this time.
"THE COURT: Now, Mr. Foreman, without indicating which
way you stand, that is, for guilt or for innocence, without
indicating which way you stand, tell the Court numerically
how the jury stands on Count 1 f
., FOREMAN RIPLEY: Last count was 10 for acquittal"THE COURT: No.
e, FOREMAN RIPLEY: I beg your pardon. I misunderstood
your question, sir.
"THE COURT: All right. Numerically how do they stand Y
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: Shall I proceed with what I said f 10
for acquittal"THE COURT: No. Without indicating whether it is for
guilt or for innocence, indicate numerically how the jury
stood.
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: 10 to 2.
"THE COURT: How did the Jury stand on Count 2 numerically, without indicating which way Y
"FOREMAN RIPLEY: Seven to five.
"THE COURT: Well, it just appears to the Court, Mr. Foreman, that this Jury has been confused. Some of the jurors
are off on a tangent. Apparcntly they have misconceived the
evidence, failed to understand the instructions or have not
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been able to apply the instructions to theevidellce. I feel that
I should declar.e this a .mistrial.
.
"The Court ueclare.s this ease a mh;trial. The Jury is discharged with the thanks of the Court."
On January 5, 1962, the court refused to entertain petitioner's plea of once in jeopardy and reset the case for trial. '
The parties have stipulated that the bailiff reported to the
judge "approximately twohour.s after, the case had been
submitted to the jury, that the foreman of the jury statf'd to
the bailiff that the jury was'hopf'lessly deadlocked,' and that
this report was made to said judge at Ii time when the court
. was not in sessiou and for that reason is not a part of the
record in said action." The stipulation expressly states that
petitioner did not waive his right to object to the admissibility of this report.
[1] Prohibition is a proper remedy to prevent retrial
when a defendant has been once in jeopardy. (Cardenas v.
Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 273,275 . [14 Cal.Rptr. 657, 363
P.2d 889] ; Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 640, 652 [328
P.2d 976]; Jackson v. Superior Court,}O Cal.2d 350, 352
(74 P.2d 243, 113 A.L.R. 1422].)
[9] "[J]eopardy attaches toa defendant when he is
placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon
a valid indictment or information before a jury duly impaneled and charged with his deliverance." (Jackson v, Superior
Court, supra.) [3] If a jury is discharged without returning a verdict, the defendant cannot again be put in jeopardy
unless he consented to the discharge or legal necessity required it. (Cardenas v. Superior Court, supra; People ,'.
Valenti,49 Ca1.2d 199, 209 [316 P.2d 633] i People v. Webb,
38 Cal. 467, 479-480.) [4] The discharge of a jury contrary to law is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal. (Jackson
v. 8uperior Court, supra, 10 CaL2d at p. 356; People v. Webb,
,upra,38 Cal. at p.478.)
.
Since petitioner did not consent to the discharge of the jury,
the sole issue is whether legal necessity required it. There is
auch necessity when "at the expiration of such time as the
court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there
is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree." (Pen.
Code, § 1140; People v. Smalling, 94 Cal. 112, 115 [29 P. 421] ;
People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, 326 [17 Am.Rep. 436] ; Ex partc
McLaughlin, 41 Cal. 211, 216 [10 Am.Rep. 272].) The People
contend that the trial judge was justified in concluding that
there was no reasonable proLaLility that the jury could agree
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because of the bailiff's report that the jury was hopelessly
deadlocked and because it was apparellt from the exchange ill
open comt bctween the judge alld the foreman of the jury
that the jurors wcre so confused as to the law and facts
of the case that they would not be able to reaeh a verdict.
[5] Although the determination whether there is a reasOllable probability that the jury can agree rests in the sound
tiisel'etion of the trial court, "( t] he power of the Court to
discharge a jury without thc conscnt of the prisoner is not
an absolute, uncontrolled discretionary power. It must be
exercised in aeeordance with established legal rules and a
sound legal discretion in the application of such rules to the
facts and circumstances of each particular case, and in this
State is subject to review by an appellate Court. H (Ex parte
McLaughlin, supra, 41 Cal. at pp. 218-219.)
[ 6 ] An extrajudicial report from the jury that it cannot
agree on a verdict does not justify its discharge. Thus in
People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, the court ordered the sheriff to
go to the jury room and inquire if the jury had reached a
verdict. The order was made in open court in the presence of
the defendant's counsel. The sheriff reported the jury's answer that they "had not, and could not agree on a verdict."
The trial judge then adjourned the court for the term one
day before the term would have expired by operation of law.
The adjournment operated as a discharge of the jury. In
holding that a subsequent trial of the defendant for the same
offense put him twice in jeopardy, the court stated, "It is
evident that in a matter so gravely affecting the life or liberty
of the accused, the discretion of the Comt should be exercised
upon some kind of evidence, and its judgment should be
expressed in some form upon the rccord. In this case there
was no evidence upon which the Court was authorizcd to act,
and no apparent adjudication ...• [The sheriff's report] was
110 evidence whatever upon which the Court could act." (48
Cal. at pp. 326-327.)
[7] The judge in the present case had less justification
for discharging the jury on the basis of the bailiff's report
than did the judge in the Cage case. When the jury was discharged in Cage, they had deliberated for four days. They
had returned to the courtroom once for instructions and had
returned on the first and third days of deliberation to announce to the court their inability to agree on a verdict. On
the second of these occasions the jury stated that they saw
I no chance for an agreement. During the fourth uay of deli1>~
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, erations, when the judge ordered the sheriff to ask the jury
.if they had reached a verdict, the defendant's counsel was
'. . present and could have interposed an objeetion to this procedure and to the subsequent order adjourning tIle court for
the term. In the presenLcase,however, the jury ,vas discharged aft~r deliberating .less than five hours. Althoughth<,y
returned to the courtroom to have four (IUestions aUl>wered,
they were.givennoopportunity to consider the judge's answersduring further deliberations. No juror ever stated ill
. open court that he thought the jury could not reach an agre<,ment. Petitioller'scounsel.was not present when the bailiff
·reported to the judge the foreman's opiuion that the jury was
.... hopelessly deadlocIC(~d.lndeed, it appears from the record
that petitioner's counseldid.llot learn of this extrajudicial
communication until the judge alluded to it in refusing to
entertain petitioner's plea of once in jeopardy 17 days after
the jury was discharged. [8] Such informal communications between court and jury are improper. (People v. Alcalde,
24 Ca1.2d 177,189 [1-18 P.2d627] ; People v. Weatherford, 27
Ca1.2d 401,418-419 [164 P.2d 753].) <4 [A]ll communications
should be made in open court. •.. Ordinary procedure would
require that the trial judge afford the parties an opportunity
to be apprised of any such communication and to have the
opportunity to make timely objection to any action by the
court or jury which might be deemed irregular." (People v.
Alcalde, sttpra.) Moreover, the judge in the Cage case discharged the jury immediately after the sheriff reported the
jury's message. In the present case the judge discharged the
jury three hours after the bailiff's report, during wllich time
the jury continued to deliberate, evidently in the belief that
they could reach a verdict. Whatever justification there may
be for the judge's discharge of the jury must therefore be
found in the exchange between him and the foreman of the
jury.
.
[9] Ordinarily the trial judge should not discharge a
jury on the ground that there is no reasonable probability that
the ju~ can agree without questioning the jurors individually
as to Such probability. (People v. Greene, 100 Cal. 140, 141
[34 P. 630] ; People v. James, 97 Cal. 400, 402 [32 P. 317] ;
People v. Smalling, 94' Cal. 112, 115 [29 P. 421]; Ex parte
JlcLatlghlin, 41 Cal. 211, 218 [10 Am.Rt-p. 272]; People v.
Sullivan, 101 Cal.App.2d 322, 327 [225 P.2d 645] ; People v.
Disperati,11 Cal.App. 469, 473 [105 P. 617].) [10] uThe
statute does not provide just what proceeding shall be taken

's
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to determine the probability of an I1greement, but no better
method occurs to us than to obtain ~ro!t\ the jurors an expressiou of their judgJllt'lI t, mill the ('ourt, iu the exercise of the
discretion committed to it, may giw SUt'll weight to this opinion as the surrounding eir,~um:;talll"es sl,'em to demand." (People v. Disperail, supra.; spc also People v. GreeHI', !'upra, 100
Cal. at p. 142; People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, 327 (17 Am.Rep.
436].) This procrdure was not followed here.
[11] Although the judge need not state that he is discharging the jury because there is no reasonable probability
that they can a~n'ee when it is apparent from the record that
he uiseharged thc jury for that reason (People v. Greene,
supra), such probability is not apparent from the record in
this case. After the jury entered the courtroom, the foreman
stated that no ycrdic-t had been reached, but he gave no indication that hp or any other juror considered further deliberations futile. His asking the judge to instruct on two points
of law and to clarify two evidentiary matters strongly suggests that the jurors felt they could reaeh a verdict if thesc
legal and factual questions eould be resolved. The short answer to the People's contention that the four questions related
. to simple matters of law and evidence and indicated that the
jury was so eonfused that they could not be expected to reach
a verdict is that the simple (luestions received simple, clear,
and forthright answers that presumably cleared up any
confusion the jury may have had. Even if the judge was
of the opinion that they were still confused, it cannot be
assumed from their questions or anything else in the record
that the law and the evid!"nce were so far beyond their understanding t hat further instructions would have been futile.
12 ] There is no merit in the People's contention that it
was necessary to discharge the jury because the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated. Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364 [81 S.Ct. 1523,6 L.Ed.2d 901], on which the People
rely, held that there was no violation of the Fifth Amendment't> prohibition against double jeopardy when the trial
judge declared the first trial a mistrial without the defendant's
consent since he "was acting according to his convictions in
protecting the rights of the accused, " and" in the sole interest
of the defendant." (367 U.S. at pp. 366, 369.) Clearly no
such motive prompted the trial judge's action in this case,
for he knew that the jury stood ten for acquittal and two for
conviction on Count 1. Moreover, we pointed out in Cardenas
, v. Superiur Court, 56 Ca1.2d 273, 275-276 [14 Cal.Rptr. 657,

r
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363 P.2d 889], that the Gori holding is not in accord with
California law.
[13] Once the jury is impaneled and sworn, the defendant is in jeopardy. He cannot be deprived of any benefit to
be derived from that jeopardy and is entitled to have the
jury render a verdict, when, as in this case, he has not consented to the discharge of the jury and there is nolegal necessity for such discharge. (People v. Ny Sa.m Ohung, 94 Cal.
304, 307 [29 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29] ; People v. Hunckeler,
48 Cal. 331, 334.)
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Gibson,C.J., Peters, .J., White, J., and Dooling,J., "Concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent.
On December 18 and 19, 1961, petitioner was tried by a
jury on two counts of grand theft. The jury retired at 4 ;12
p.m. on December 19 and returned to the courtroom at 9 :05
p.m. When the court asked if the jury had arrived at a verdict, the foreman replied: "Your Honor, we have not reached
a verdict. We have some questions that we would like to ask
and advice from the Court if we may'"
The :first question, relating to count 1, was whether a charge
of theft is nullified if the victim agreed to accept weekly payments as restitution. The court reread an instruction that
restitution is not a defense.
The second question, relating to count 2, was, ('Would
llegligence in the care of the funds, whereby another person
may have stolen the money still leave the Defendant responsible and guilty of theft'" The court answered: "Well, Mr.
Foreman, we are here only concerned with the charge against
the Defendant. No one else is charged with theft. The Defendant is not charged with negligence, he is charged with
theft. If from the evidence you find that the Defendant is
not guilty, find him not guilty. If under the evidence you
find that he is guilty, find him guilty in accordance with the
evidence and the instructions. Now, that is all the Court can
say."
The court, of course, had previously advised the jury that
if there was any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he was entitled to a verdict of not guilty. The information had also been read to the jury and the essential
elements of the offense explained to them.
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The third and fourth questions involved two evidentiary
matters that were clarified by thecollrt .and counsel. The
following exchange then ensued: ., THE COURT : What is your
.llext question' FOREMAN.RIPLEY: That is all I have here,
in the..~inFds of
Your fHtohno~, unlesstsoth~e t~uestioTn haCs arisen N
any 0
e Jurors a
18 Ime.
HE. OURT:· ow, J,Y.Lr.. oreman, without indicating which way you stand, that is, for
guilt or for innocence, without indicating which way you
stand, tell the Court numerically how the jury stands on
Count 17 FOREMAN RIPLEY: Last count was 10 for. acquittal. THE COURT: No. FOREMAN RIPLEY: I beg your pardon. I
misunderstood your question, sir. THE COURT: All right. Numerically how do they stand' FOREMAN RIPLEY: Shall I proceed with what I said T 10 for acquittal-THE COURT : No.
Without indicating whether it is for guilt or for innocence,
indicate numerically how the jury stood 'FOREMAN RIPLEY:
10 to 2. THE COURT: How did the Jury stand on Count 2
numerically, without indicating which wayf FORE1UNRIP- ..
LEY: Seven to five. THE COURT : Well, it just appears to. the
Court, Mr. Foreman, that this Jury has been confused. Some
of the jurors are off on a·· tangent. Apparently they have
misconceived the evidence, failed to understand theinstructions or have not been able to apply the instructions to the
evidence. I feel that I should declare this a mistrial. The
Court declares this case a mistrial. The Jury is discharged
with the thanks of the Court."
The question here presented is whether the trial judge was
justified under section 1140 of the Penal Code in discharging
the jury. I believe he was.. .
.
Section 1140 of the Penal Code provides: "Except as pro;
:vided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause
is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict
and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the ea;piration
of such time (J,S the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily
appears Jhat there is no rC(J,SonGble probability that the jur"
can agree." (Italics added.)
.
Whether there is a re~onable probability that the jury can
agree rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The
power of the court to discharge a jury without the consent
of the prisoner is not absolute; it must be exercised in accordance with established legal rules and a sound legal discretion
Lin the application of such rules to the facts and circuDlStances

.,1,:,
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of each particular case. (Ex parte McLaughli11, 41 Cal. 211,
218 et seq. [10 Am.Rep. 272].)
In the instant case the trial judge questioned the foreman
in the presence of all parties as to how the jury stood numerically on reaching a verdict. After receiving this information
and having fully instructed the jury as to the elements of
the offense charged and having observed the jurors for two
days and listened to the questions of the foreman and his
answers to the judge's questions relative to the standing of
the jury, the trial judge was justified in finding that the jury
was unable to agrce and therefore, under the provisions of
section 1140 of the Penal Code, incoming to the conclusion
that there was no reasonable probability that the jury could
agree and was correct in his ruling discharging them.
This conclusion is supported by the rule in this state that
on appeal all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in
favor of the respondent and all legitimate and reasonable
inferences indulged to uphold the findings of the trial court
if possible. Where the findings are attacked for insufficiency
of the evidence, the power of the appellate court begins and
ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence to support them. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Ca1.2d
221, 223 [2] [143 P.2d 689J.)
In Estate of Bristol this court said, at page 223 [3] : "It is
common knowledge among judges and lawyers that many cases
are determined to the entire satisfaction of trial judges or
juries, on their factual issues, by evidence which is overwhelming in its persuasiveness but which may appear relatively
unsubstantial-if it call be reflected at all-in a phonographic
record. Appe1late courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable
doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding,
should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding; and in
searching the record and exploring the inferences which may
arise from what is found there, to discover whether such doubt
or conflict exists, the court should be realistic and practicaL"
Upon such a view of the law, the finding of the trial court in
the present case ~hould be sustained.
The factual situation presented to the jury in the case at
bar was not complicated. The owner of a restaurant at Lake
Tahoe had engaged petitioner and his wife to manage the
restaurant. Thc terms were $100 per week and either onehalf or one-third of the net profits. Petitioner was to receive
$75 pcr week and his wife $25. They were also to have lodging
and certain meals at the restaurant. The owner stayed with

)
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petitioner for several days to show him the procedure for
bookkeeping and procured for him deposit bags for the money
which was to beleft each evening in the bank's night depository. The owner came up to Lake Tahoe once a week and paid
the employees and took back with him the tapes from thecash
register and tickets in order to set up his own ledger and
have his accountant .post the figures.
This arrangement began about August 12 or 13. August
29 when the owner arrived at Lake Tahoe he found that petitioner had' not made any deposits for the period August 21
through August 27. He had a conversation with petitioner,
in which petitioner admitted that he had used this money to
payoff his own pressing bad checks and promised to repay
the moDf"y at $50 per week. The owner agreed, since petitioner
had already taken the money.
On September 1] the owner was advised by another employee that petitioner had left the premises and taken all of
his belongings with him. The owner theneame up to Lake
Tahoe and found that although the receipts and register tapes
were left in the restaurant, no money had been deposited in
the bank account for September 8, 9, or 10, nor was the $150
present which had been kept in. the register for change. He
also found that the special deposit bags he had given. petitioner to use had been in the bank since the last deposit on
Septpmber 7.
The net amount taken for the period August 22 through
August 27 was approximately $642.33, and the amount taken
for the period September 8 through September 11 was $411.92.
Petitioner made no demand for his last pay check or for an
accounting and left no forwarding address. The net profit
for the period that petitioner operated the restaurant was
approximately $130.
Petitioner's defense was that as to the first count relating
to the money taken during the period August 21 through
August 27, he had this money undeposited when he spoke to
the owner, and asked to borrow it, and the owner agreed that
he could borrqw it and repay it at $50 per week; that they
had no discussion of any interest; and that he used it to pick
up his outstanding bad checks, which he immediately destroyed.
.
As to the second count, petitioner alleged that he had each
day's deposit in a money bag, which he at first put in his car
when he was thinking about leaving the employ of the owner,
and then just before he left, he placed these money bags in

)
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the box inthc restaurant with the rE'gister tapes and left them
there with a note to the owner that he was leaving and would
. write him after he was settled.
A further defense was petitioner's aJ!egedill health from
his high fever, which, according to the testimony of his expert,
resulted in his suffering from an intoxication due to endogenous intoxicants .. This resulted, according to the expert's
testimony, in a clouding of petitioner's consciousness.
With this statement of the evidence in mind, it appears that
the questions asked by the foreman of the jury patently displayed the jury's misconception of the charge of theft. .
The first question was as to whether the agreement to accept
weekly payments by the victim would nullify a possible charge .
of theft and change it to the •• status of a contract to pay on
installments.' ,
The question with relation to the second count was whether
negligence in the care of funds by petitioner whereby another person stole the money would leave him responsible for
the theft.
A subsequent question related to the whereabouts of the
keys to the bags. The record contained no testimony in this
regard.
Thereafter the jury was questioned as to their numerical
division on each count. It was 10-2 on the first count and
7-5 on the second. It was at this point that the court declared
a mistrial.
It is apparent that if the jury believed petitioner and his
testimony, he would not have had a fraudulent intent. However, they apparently did not believe this, or at least some
of them did not comprehend the instructions of the court that
restitution is 110ta defense.
The trial judge viewed the individuals comprising the jury
and was familiar with their demeanor and at least to some
extent with their individual propensities. From the questions
propounded to him he apparently concluded that they could
not reach an agreement on any count, inasmuch as .some of
them obviously had not comprehended the evidence, the instructions of the court, or the elements of the charges which
were before them. Under those circumstances it was not
unreasonable for the judge to conclude that it was unlikely
that all of the jurors could ever agree on a verdict. Hence
the discharge of the jury by the court could not be said to be .
an abuse of discretion. (People v. Sullivan, 101 Cal.App.2d j
322, 328 et seq. [225 P.2d 645].)
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'I'he time that a jury should be held for deliberation is
within the trial court's discretion. (People v. Casserio, 16 Cal.
App.2d 223, 228 [41 [60 P.2d 5051; People v. Wooley, 15
Cal.App.2d 669, 673 [21 [59 P.2d 10651.)
The result which I have reached is supported by the Supreme Court of the United States in its holding in National
Labor Relat·ions Board v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369
U.S. 404 [82 S.Ct. 853, 855, 7 L.Ed.2d 8291, where the court
said: "But the Examiner-the one whose appraisal of the
testimony was discredited by the Court of Appeals in Florida
Citrus Canners Cooperative case-sees the witnesses and hears'
them testify, while the Board and the reviewing court look
only at cold records. As we said in the Univc1'sal Camera case
[340 U.S. 474 (71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456)] : '. . . The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance
of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance
of credibility in the particular case.' 340 U.S., at 406, 71 S.Ct.
at 469. For the demeanor of a witness' ... may satisfy the
tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but
that the truth is the opposite of his story; for the denial of
one, who has a motive to deny, may be uttered with such
hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no
alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies.' Dyer
v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269."
The peremptory writ of prohibition, in my opinion, should
be denied.
Schauer, J., concurred.
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